The decision by the UN International Court of Justice, The Hague, announced on July22, according to which Kosovo’s proclamation of independence does not contradict international law, became the news of the day in Armenia where such a decision is believed to nullify Azerbaijan’s claims that the Armenian nation cannot gain independence twice and have two states.

“The Hague decision has made it obvious that whatever Azerbaijan is talking about completely contradicts international law. The International Court of Justice has essentially said: two Albanian states – Albania and Kosovo – have gained independence,” says Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Shavarsh Kocharyan expressing official Yerevan’s position.

Kocharyan pointed out also that the decision was unprecedented in a sense that, for the first time, The Hague touched upon a population’s right to self-determination and territorial integrity and the interrelation of these two issues, and made a decision in accordance with the UN Charter.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s Albanian authorities unilaterally proclaimed their independence from Serbia. More than 69 states have recognized Kosovo’s independence since. Nonetheless, two permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia and China – do not recognize Kosovo’s independence.

Today, it’s hard to say how the Hague decision might impact the principles of the Karabakh issue settlement, given the fact that many western diplomats have repeatedly stated that Kosovo and Karabakh are two absolutely different issues.

And, before speaking about applying “Kosovo’s precedent”, the concept of “Kosovo’s precedent” has to be defined first. It’s a double-edged sword, as much as it is meant to shake the bases of double standards, it is equally meant to enforce the virtual character of international safety guarantees.

It should be enough to recall the international excitement with which Serbia’s new constitution was accepted only four years ago. This celebration came a few months after Montenegro’s secession, in 2006, when it seemed it couldn’t possibly go farther, considering the fact that back then Serbia lost its last exit to the sea.

It was under these circumstances of permanent concessions that Serbia’s current Constitution was adopted, called to show and prove that Serbian concessions were by no means unilateral.

The preamble of the document said in part: “Citizens of Serbia adopt the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, based on state traditions of the Serbian people and the equality of rights of all citizens and ethnic communities of Serbia, as well as based on the fact that Kosovo and Metohija are composite parts of the territory of Serbia and have a right to autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia”.

That statement essentially meant: this is it, no one will touch Serbia from now on. What happened to “international guarantees” is common knowledge. Hence a conclusion: the “Kosovo precedent” is indeed a double-edged sword, and moreover, the second edge of it is much sharper and more often used in the international practice.

That edge is the proof of non-existence of international guarantees. The Constitution adopted under the pressure of “world community” today has turned into a mere piece of paper in the hands of the same community.

The second aspect is more complicated. The thing is that more and more new political entities – recognized, unrecognized, “semi-recognized” (Eritrea, East Timor, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) – have proclaimed state sovereignty within the borders that had formed by the time of conflict, whereas in case with Karabakh the concepts of “current Republic of Nagorno Karabakh” (NKR) and “former Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh” (ARNK) are quite different.

The territory of today’s NKR is approximately 13,000 sq. m, whereas former ARNK’s territory was only 4, 500 sq. m.

When speaking about the necessity of applying Kosovo’s precedent to the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination, nobody knows what territory exactly it is referred to.

It is noteworthy that the indefiniteness in this issue is one of the main reasons why the Republic of Armenia itself has not recognized NKR’s independence.

It is hard to say to what extent the Armenian community in its current state allows to hold discussions on this issue, however, one thing is clear: sooner or later this issue will become the main domestic political issue in Armenia capable of provoking a major crisis for the authorities, under certain circumstances.

One way or another, at the moment, it is impossible to automatically apply the Kosovo principles to the Karabakh issue. The two above stated obstacles have to be overcome before the moment – yet in the indefinite future – when the international community is ready to apply the principle of national self-determination to Nagorno Karabakh.