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Approved in January of this year, the Strategy of Armenia’s National Security states: “…the Republic of Armenia is committed to settling the conflict only in a peaceful way on the basis of mutual compromises. The legal bases of the declaration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) are irreproachable. Constantly proceeding from the principle that any final agreement or ultimate document must get the approval of the Karabakh side, Armenia finds it acceptable only those variants of settlement that will be aimed at the consolidation of the irreversibility of the reality of the NKR’s factual existence. Nagorno-Karabakh must have a territorial link with Armenia. Security must be guaranteed.”

Despite the seeming simplicity and clarity of the issue, in fact everything is much more complicated and controversial; the historical resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the then Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) about reunification adopted in December 1989 contradicts the fact of the declaration of the NKR and the Republic of Armenia in September 1991.

Another, equally remarkable event took place in the period between those three events: on August 23, 1990, the parliament of Armenia adopted a Declaration on Armenia’s independence which was based on the fact that the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were an inseparable political whole. The preamble to the document does not leave any doubts on this account: “Based on the joint resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh adopted on December 1, 1989 ‘On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh’, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia declares the start of the process of the establishment of independent statehood.”

A natural question arises in that case: which of the four events is paramount?

As one could expect, the discussions of this question have acquired a particularly acute nature in recent days. Igor Muradyan, an expert of the “Kavkaz” analytical center, one of the ideologists and leaders of the Karabakh movement in 1988, thinks that similar contradictions show that a precedent of ignoring major state decisions has been developed in Armenian political circles. Furthermore, he says that the recognition of NKR at the present moment meets the interests of international organizations overseeing the problem.

“The recognition of NKR under the given political and social conditions means nothing else but giving up lowland Karabakh, 7,600 square kilometers of our Homeland, to please foreign forces and for the sake of relieving a headache. If the Armenian parliament is capable of making a decision on ‘recognition’, then only within the borders of the former Soviet-Armenian ghetto named NKAR. Who needs such recognition and a new ghetto already in conditions of ‘liberal democracy’? It is patently clear that apart from Armenian politicians it is needed for political project developers from organizations like the International Crisis Group and its patrons. And it turns out that this and similar initiatives are the essence of the notorious settlement reduced to extinguishing conflicts and not realizing the national-political rights of our people.”

The well-known political analyst thus thinks that the legislative initiative of the Heritage party is aimed at recognizing the territory of the former NKAR and not the really existing NKR outside Azerbaijan. In other words, he thinks that a substitution of notions takes place in this case as the former NKAR is presented as the NKR. In his opinion, “the leading powers of the West and the East are interested in the establishment of this very NKR, as a second sovereign Armenian state.”

Apart from other things, Muradyan thinks that the possible recognition of the independence of the whole territory (Nagorno-Karabakh, i.e. mountainous or upland Karabakh, and lowland Karabakh) controlled by the NKR Defense Army does not meet the interests of the current generation of Armenian leaders both in Yerevan and Stepanakert. “The Armenian political class does not imagine what to do with this recognition which is to mark the beginning of huge work. The current parliament of Armenia is a team of firm and consistent proponents of conformism as a basic political stereotype of behavior. It is completely unacceptable also for the administration in Stepanakert. A reliable political basis for ceding the lands of lowland Karabakh to Azerbaijanis was created as a result of parliamentary and presidential elections in the NKR.”

The recognition of NKR by Armenia would be an ideal catalyst of regional processes, which, no doubt, would lead to the establishment of a completely new international situation, or would rather strengthen the established tendency of the collapse of “small empires”. Different arguments in regards to the possible resumption of military operations are groundless in Muradyan’s opinion. “Azerbaijan cannot achieve the necessary level of sovereignty for making independent decisions about the start of a war of revenge for the Karabakh province. Neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan attach any importance to the agreements and obligations, they have their own vision of international relations and are capable of ignoring any political conditions. The decision about the start of an Azeri-Armenian war can be made only and only in Ankara.”